Many people put Wittgenstein Known as the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. In the second half of the twentieth century, philosophical works were almost invariably called Wittgenstein.
But Wittgenstein is not easy to read, and neither his early works nor his later works are easy to read, just for different reasons. One of the reasons his early work, Tractus Logico-Philosophize, was difficult to read was that it was written in aphorisms, and that he had special uses for many of the concepts, with his own special, "strict" definitions. His late work, Philosophical Investigations, is also difficult to read, although it is written in the plainest language and syntax, and it is quite easy to read, but the trouble is that the reader will feel that he is talking here and there, and it is always unclear where he is really going. I have heard many people say that they do not understand Philosophical Investigations, including very intelligent people who feel something but miss the point. Philosophical Investigations is difficult to read, and must be considered in connection with Wittgenstein's basic understanding of philosophy, because Wittgenstein's philosophy is very different from our usual understanding of philosophy. Wittgenstein, for example, argued that philosophy is not about providing theories. The whole Western philosophical tradition is theoretical. For example, philosophers of language have provided various theories of meaning, the denotational theory of meaning, the ideational theory of meaning, the verifiable theory of meaning, etc. Wittgenstein studied the philosophy of language, but he did not admit what theory he proposed. Philosophy is not a theory, and in Wittgenstein it is not just a formulation, he does it by the way he does philosophy. This alone makes us find his style and themes difficult to grasp. Wittgenstein's Philosophy in the later period: a conceptual survey If Wittgenstein has a definition of philosophy, then the standard definition is "philosophy is the investigation of concepts." But what is "conceptual investigation"? Many of the words that we use, like run, jump, justice, human rights, beautiful, beautiful, reasonable, these are words that we call concepts. We speak and discuss problems using concepts and without them. We often speak of things in terms of concepts without examining them. From the age of three or four, we can say run, walk, jump, and we have said it all our lives, and we have never missed it. But if you are now a dictionary writer, or engaged in some linguistic work, and you are asked to define walk, run, jump, I believe that you will not be able to define these words without thinking. In other words, using a concept to speak is not the same as examining and defining the concept itself. I could say it's on two levels. To put it crudly, we usually speak in the first order, that is, we use concepts to say things, philosophy is the second order, philosophy is to say something about concepts. Now let us go back to this formulation of conceptual examination and look at historical philosophy. Philosophy is generally said to begin with Plato or Socrates, but in Plato's dialogues we don't really know which is Platonic and which is Socratic. Of course we also speak of the pre-Socratic philosophers, but philosophy as a systematic inquiry begins with Plato. If we think back to the dialogues of Plato or Socrates, what does it look like to be considered philosophical? Plato asks in the form of: What is justice? What is beauty? What is knowledge? What is good? It can be said that each dialogue roughly answers such a question. In other words, Plato is engaged in a conceptual investigation. We usually speak in terms of beauty, justice, knowing whether to know, reasonable or not, but we do not examine these concepts themselves. What do you mean by this word in Platonic dialogue, when someone says something first, and then Socrates manages to go around in circles and lead the question to a conceptual investigation and force the other person to answer? How should the term be defined? In this way, the Socratic dialogue leads us from our usual first-order conversation to a second-order examination of concepts. The idea that philosophy is second-order thinking is familiar to everyone. In fact, philosophers therefore feel that they should think and write in some kind of metalanguage. For example, Tai Chi, Wu Wei, such as knowledge, emotion, meaning, when philosophers talk about "knowledge", including what we usually say about knowing, understanding, understanding, understanding, understanding, and so on a large family of brothers and sisters, they are close, adjacent or have something in common. When we actually speak, if we are not writing philosophy, when we use "know" and when we use "understand", most of us have to distinguish clearly, otherwise the Chinese teacher will say that you do not understand Chinese, but when we do philosophy, we tend to use one word to sum up all these words, and even think that this philosophical "know" is the common abstraction of all these concepts. Wittgenstein called such a processed concept a superconcept. For thousands of years, it seemed inevitable that people would have to construct super concepts to think philosophically, and that they would engage in philosophy with super concepts, for better or for worse. This is a means of constructing philosophical theory, and also a sign of constructing philosophical theory. Wittgenstein's refusal to engage in philosophy in the way of constructivism is highlighted by the fact that he does not use metalanguage to do philosophy and does not use super concepts to explore philosophy. He says: Is it possible to do second-order things in a first-order way, to do philosophy in a way of talking about things? Conceptual examination is the examination of those concepts that we already use, or as it is called in philosophical circles, the consideration of concepts used in everyday language, the examination of natural concepts. Why is that? Because the reason we need to look at these concepts is because there are disagreements and arguments about how they should be described. Sometimes there is even disagreement about how to use these concepts. We have confusion and debate here, so we are trying to clarify it. For example, if there is a debate on human rights, one side says rights are this and that, and the other side says rights are this and that, so we need to clarify the concept of rights. If you make up a concept yourself, we do not use it, so there is no confusion about it, so there is no need to clarify it. We can say that conceptual investigation and empirical work are two levels of things. For example, we all use the phrase "why". But sometimes I say, there's no reason for it. You say, why not? Everything has a why. This is when we have to talk about why itself, for example to find out whether it is possible to ask why for everything. You may not be able to make that clear. I came to class, everyone was sitting here, and one of the students came in half an hour later, and I said, Why are you late? The question is understandable to everyone. But if I walk into the classroom and everyone is there on time, and I say hello to the people sitting there, why aren't you late? This is a question you don't understand. You couldn't answer it, not because you weren't smart enough, but because I was a little stupid and asked a stupid question so that you didn't know what I was asking. But now it seems there are some things you can't ask why. But what can you ask and what can't you ask why? To consider such questions is to explore the structure of the concept of "why". Wittgenstein said that philosophy, as a conceptual investigation, asks only what we already know. The world is busy seeking new knowledge, the philosopher is not so, he stays in what we already know. Chuang Tzu said, "The whole world knows what they don't know, but not what they already know." Lao-Tzu even said, "To learn more and more is to lose." Finding reason in what is known is another feature of conceptual investigation. To the extent that one often misuses the word experience, philosophy is non-empirical, in short, it does not depend on the discovery of more empirical facts. The function of philosophy is healing Philosophy does not provide a theory of the world, as science does, which leads us to another fundamental formulation of Wittgenstein's philosophy. He believed that the function of philosophy, simply put, was to heal. It is also at odds with what most people imagine of philosophy, whose task is probably to construct, not to heal. Let me also introduce the concept of healing from several aspects. First of all, we need treatment when we're sick. But why are we so prone to trouble with conceptual thinking? It has been said that in our daily life we are bound to make an examination of the concepts we use, and yet we usually speak more in terms of concepts than in terms of concepts, and we are not, so to speak, trained in the examination of concepts. As a result, we often make mistakes when making conceptual investigations. Conceptual examination is not our forte. At the age of two, we began to ask why, everything, why the sky is blue, why Dad smokes, why dad is not mom, maybe profound, maybe blind questions. From the age of three or four, we know what things ask why and what things don't ask why. But as we said, it's never easy to say why it makes sense to ask in these things and why it doesn't. We almost never use the wrong concept in the first level, unless you are poor in elementary school Chinese. In fact, "even without a day of school, many people can speak very well." I would say that speaking is something that comes naturally to us. Conceptual investigation is not something we are born to do, it is something we need to spend special attention to do. Therefore, in second-order thinking, we are prone to error. Some people may refute that we may have doubts and disagreements at the first level, whether a certain situation should be called experience or experience, whether a certain policy should be called justice or fairness, and we may have disagreements. I fully admit that. But words such as experience, experience, feeling, justice, and right are naturally like second-order words, which I usually call rational words, and which are inherently strongly theoretical. Philosophical work, as I'll show in a moment, is primarily concerned with these kinds of concepts. Here, the debate about the use of concepts is really a debate about how to describe them. When I talk about misapplied concepts, I usually mean misapplied concepts of this kind. When we use these words, it is easy to cause disagreements, and these disagreements lead us to arguments about the concept itself. We often argue: What is right? What is reasonable? What is happiness? What is happiness? We may begin by discussing whether Americans or Chinese are happier, whether modern people are happier or ancient people are happier, but such discussions are almost never purely factual arguments, and almost always involve conceptual investigations. When we think about problems, we often unconsciously construct theories, saying that someone is happy and someone is unhappy, at this time you do not construct theories, but when you answer what is happiness, you have almost entered the preparatory stage of theoretical construction, it seems that if you continue to ask questions, you have to construct an ethics. In fact, that's exactly what happened. What does Plato or Socrates use as a dialogue to talk about justice? Political science was born. We use a dialogue to ask what is matter, what is the motion of matter, and physics is born. People want to understand the universe, and they think the most important way to understand the universe is to build a theory about the universe. To understand the state, to understand life, to understand nature, we must construct politics, ethics, physics, and through theory we will have a thorough understanding of these things. It is in this place that Wittgenstein's philosophy diverges most from the traditional philosophy. If we traditionally believe that philosophy is a theoretical construction, then Wittgenstein believes that philosophy is a theoretical deconstruction. Wittgenstein himself doesn't seem to use the word deconstruction, we just say dissolve. How do we construct a theory? Before the modern scientific revolution, theories were constructed by examining basic concepts. The basic concept of ethics is good, and together with good there is justice, happiness, disposition, and then luck, character, ends, means, meaning, death, and so on. If you want to construct a theory of physics, then you have to systematically question and study the most basic concepts of motion, change, rest, motion, time, and space. These basic concepts seem to contain clues to the structure of the world. Of course, as our research deepens, we will find that the concepts we usually use are not accurate, so we adjust and transform these concepts. The air of air, we all know what it means, but philosophers have turned it into a super concept to refer to something that is everywhere. As a weapon, philosophers also give it a broader meaning. Philosophers use the concepts of reason, qi and organ to construct a grand theory about life in the universe. This is how ancient theories were constructed. It was not often that ancient theorists invented new concepts, but mostly they constructed their theories by giving some new meaning to ordinary concepts. But the situation changed in the sixteenth and seventh centuries. The thinkers of the sixteenth and seventh centuries, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, they created a new way of thinking, the way of thinking of modern science. It is not possible here to describe the way in which the new theory is structured, but it is clear that the new physics points to Aristotle or Aristotelianism. New thinkers find that we repeatedly ask for the deep content of concepts, "seemingly constantly put forward new insights, new statements, but in fact only in what we already understand in the swirl, and do not produce new knowledge." To promote the development of knowledge, we must break the shackles of traditional concepts and boldly adopt new ones. Let's take the most common example, which is the case of motion and rest. We all know what is motion and what is rest, but Galileo, Descartes, and Newton changed these concepts, and the new physics claimed that what we normally see at rest is actually in a straight line of uniform motion, which we all learned in junior high physics. The new physics changes the concepts we use to describe the world and changes the way we describe it. We probably all now accept that modern physics is correct, that its description of the world is correct, scientific, and truly scientific knowledge. Aristotle The theory is wrong, invalid and should be abandoned. The Western theoretical impulse seems to have finally found the right way to construct theory through Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. Since then, philosophy has been facing an existential crisis. The sense of crisis is gradually becoming clearer. Before that there was no such crisis, because philosophers were scientists, theorists, those who provided the correct picture of the world. But when this work is taken over by scientists, and apparently done far more successfully, what is left for philosophy to do becomes a headache for philosophers. We have several options, and when I say these options, I say them in an external way, and I don't think they are all parallel options. Modern physics has been a great success, no problem. But let's go back to the beginning. Why did we construct a theory in the first place? To better understand the world. Do scientific theories help us understand the world better? It's a little inappropriate to ask this question in this scientific day. But in spite of it, allow me to ask. We have an understanding of the world, but we also have a lot of confusion. For example, we all have a lot of confusion about time. We know that many aspects of the time problem have been solved in physics. For example, time has no beginning. Astrophysics says that time began with the Big Bang. We also know the relationship between time and speed, the faster the speed, the slower time passes, close to the speed of light, time becomes extremely slow. We can read about these things in any popular science book or science fiction. But have the theories of physics, these extremely successful and profound theories, solved the puzzle of time? Augustine once asked: What was God doing before He created the world? He replied that time was created with the creation of the world, so there was no such thing as "before" God created the world. I don't know if you're satisfied with Agustin's answer. If you're still confused by Augustine's answer, you're probably still confused by the fact that there was no time before the Big Bang. The confusion here may not be dispelled by further advances in physics. Not to mention, the confusion about time is obviously linked to our awareness of life and death, exclamation, or something of the sort. We begin with the hope of understanding through theory, of constructing theory through thinking about concepts. It was later discovered that to construct a theory that gave a correct picture of the world, it was not possible to think about concepts alone, we needed to change our concepts, we needed to construct many new concepts. But when we construct such a theory, however much it may help us to understand things, it does not help us to solve our conceptual puzzles, "because the roots of these puzzles are buried in the natural concepts we used to think and speak, and however advanced our science is today, we cannot abandon these natural concepts." We are still using these natural concepts when dealing directly with the world." Now we can understand Wittgenstein's philosophy better. Wittgenstein simply said that philosophy does not provide any theories at all, and that providing theories is the business of science. But philosophy does not have nothing to do, because science, while providing theories, does not eliminate our conceptual confusion. The work of philosophy is to clarify meaning through conceptual examination. Science is concerned with truth; philosophy is concerned with meaning. Philosophy makes a conceptual investigation, and this conceptual investigation is not the work of constructing theories, and we have seen that theories constructed through the investigation of concepts are pseudo-theories. The purpose of the conceptual study is to treat. At a small level, it cures our misuse of concepts; In a major sense, it cures our urge to construct theories through conceptual descriptions. Philosophy aims to dispel our misunderstanding of certain expressions. Above I quote Wittgenstein as saying that certain misunderstandings can be eliminated by substituting forms of expression. This is not to say that the latter is impossible to misunderstand. A misunderstanding is always a specific misunderstanding, and we try to eliminate it when it occurs. Instead, we find the real expression hidden beneath the everyday expression, and once grounded in this real expression, the expression is sufficiently clarified that we cannot misunderstand it. Wittgenstein said: We do not need any theory, we do not explain anything, we only describe. A lot of people think how is that possible? What is philosophy without theory? But that's exactly what Wittgenstein meant. It is true that Wittgenstein challenges a series of our deeply held ideas, and I can only provide a preliminary introduction today, so that everyone knows that there is such a challenge, whether he is reasonable or not, you have to rely on your own to read Wittgenstein's works. Wittgenstein himself likened philosophy more to psychotherapy than to physical therapy. We are all, to some extent, mentally ill, and if it were not for the philosopher in each of us, we would not need a philosophy in the therapeutic sense. But we don't count ourselves as mentally ill. Who are the typical intellectual sufferers? It is those who construct theories out of concepts, those who we normally call philosophers, who are the typical sick people, the ones who most need treatment. When we're hurt, we say, "I'm hurt." A philosopher would say, my body is wounded. He felt he was more accurate because he had a theory to back up his more accurate statement. We ordinary people learn to talk like that. As we said before, there is a philosopher in all of us. Philosophy is a specialized treatment, and there is a specialized criticism and critique to which philosophy belongs. This criticism is directed against those errors into which our primary reflection almost inevitably falls, and which we almost inevitably avoid once we begin to reflect on concepts: abstract universals, universals, the denigratory theory of meaning, the private theory of word meaning, the atomism of sense, all belong. As soon as we get to second-order thinking, it's almost always going to be that way, not because you're particularly stupid or eccentric, but these things are almost inherent in intellectual reflection. In short, what we generally call philosophy is precisely what philosophy seeks to cure and criticize. It might even be said that the word "philosophy" has a double meaning. What these two have in common is that they are reflections on common sense, that they are second-order, whereas our primary reflections tend to rise to theory and become bad philosophy. If there is no bad philosophy, there is no need for good philosophy. In fact, Wittgenstein uses the word philosophy in a double sense, on the one hand, as something to be criticized, and on the other, as his own work. Others, such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, often speak of philosophy in these two senses. Wittgenstein was not a historian of philosophy, but he had a deep understanding of the whole context of Western culture. He did not study the classics of philosophy, but he has many aspects of cultivation, and has a deep understanding of music, novels, philosophy, science, and technology. So we look at Wittgenstein's insight into the nature of philosophy in the context of the entire history of Western thought. The philosophy of the twentieth century still does not seem to fit Wittgenstein's definition of philosophy. Take Heidegger's philosophy for example. Many of Heidegger's ideas, as far as I can personally see, echo Wittgenstein's quite well. I do not mean that they influenced each other; these two philosophers hardly knew each other at all. It may be said that it is precisely because the origins of the two of them are so far apart, so their echoes are more meaningful and more thought-provoking. But what I want to say here is that Heidegger likes to talk about Western history, Western destiny, Western conceptual history, what we call grand narratives. Wittgenstein sees no such grand narrative. When we understand his philosophy, we know more or less why he avoided macro narrative, because philosophy is not a first-order descriptive work at all. However, it seems that we cannot therefore deny that what Heidegger did was also philosophy. From this point of view, Wittgenstein's definition of philosophy, although of great significance, is somewhat narrow. I think the core of philosophy is critical conceptual examination, but on a broader scale, philosophy also includes conceptual criticism. The two words concept and concept, time relations, can not be detailed here. Generally speaking, ideas are general and socially oriented, and concepts are in terms of sense. That's not my definition, that's how the words concept, concept are used. We say that in recent years, the employment concept of college students has undergone a great change, not to mention the concept of employment has changed. The concept of employment is in terms of its overall social thinking mode, it can be said that the concept of employment is concerned by sociologists, and the concept of employment is studied by economists. We have previously quoted Wittgenstein as saying that our grammatical inquiry is illuminated by philosophical questions. But to say that the grammatical examination of philosophy differs from that of grammarians in that the former draws its light from philosophical problems is a bit like a circular argument. I think we can broaden Wittgenstein's formulation a little bit here. The grammatical investigation of philosophy depends on the criticism of ideas. Conceptual criticism requires not only a keen observation of social phenomena, but also an analysis of conceptual meaning. Further, we see that philosophers who focus on macroscopic history, like Heidegger, are not historians but historians of ideas, and he criticizes popular ideas by combing through the history of ideas. A philosopher in the narrow sense is someone who specializes in the interpretation of concepts. Conceptual investigation constitutes the core of conceptual criticism. Similarly, the study of conceptual history is the core of the study of conceptual history, and a large part of the work of Heidegger and Gadamer is the study of conceptual history. So philosophy has a broad sense and a narrow sense, a critique of ideas and a conceptual investigation. Wittgenstein defined and engaged in philosophy entirely in the narrow sense or in the core sense. But I believe that we must also include philosophy in a broad sense, which not only makes our definition of philosophy more realistic Philosopher. And, more importantly, it is the criticism of ideas that gives meaning to the philosophical examination of concepts and gives them "light." Conceptual criticism involves both social observation and conceptual investigation, which can be said to be a mixture of the two. Then when the conceptual criticism is carried out more deeply in theory, the conceptual investigation work will be mentioned on the agenda. Of course, when it comes to the agenda, there is not necessarily someone to do it, we clearly know that we should do it, but no one does it, and there is no way. When I say that the examination of concepts is the core of philosophy, it is not in a social sense, of course, but in a purely academic sense. In a social sense, conceptual work is always very marginal, the kind of work that always sits on the bench. The ideological and cultural hot spot of the society is always conceptual criticism, because it is directly related to us ordinary people. My experience is that ordinary people are more interested in conceptual criticism, and even if they sometimes take an interest in conceptual analysis, they mostly grasp it as conceptual criticism, while the cultural critic or conceptual critic is sometimes genuinely interested in the content of conceptual analysis.
0 評論
Socrates, one of the most influential philosophers in Western history, had a unique vision of the ideal State, which is outlined in Plato's works, especially in The Republic. Socrates believed that the ideal state would be one ruled by a philosopher king. This country is characterized by wisdom, virtue and justice, and that philosophers, not democracies, were best suited to lead the country.
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